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The World of Wigs: Military Reservists and
Their Wearing of Short Hair Wigst
Neil J. Dilloff*
1. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The wearing of wigs by military reservists as a method of conform-
ing with the respective grooming and haircut standards set by the
various Armed Services has burgeoned into a panoply of litigation in
the past few years. The position of the Armed Forces in this matter
has been basically one of opposing the use of short hair wigs to meet
haircut standards, while the arguments of the reservists have centered
on their "quasi-military" status and the fact that by the use of hair-
pieces they are outwardly conforming to the hair regulations and poli-
cies. This article will deal with several facets of the controversy in-
cluding when a reservist can safely wear a wig, what written and
unwritten regulations the military has used to attempt to thwart this
method of compliance, the development of the pertinent cases, the
prospects for future litigation and a suggested solution to the problem.
A. Reservists: The Wearing of Wigs for Weekend Drill
and for Summer Active Duty
The wig controversy has thus far centered primarily on the wearing
of wigs during the reservist's weekend drills. The only other contact
t The views expressed by this article must be considered the views of the individual
author and do not purport to promulgate or voice the views of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Navy, or any other agency or department of the United States.
A.B., 1970, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., 1973, Georgetown
University Law Center. Presently serving in the Litigation and Claims Division, Office of
the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
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of reservists with active duty occurs during the reservist's summer
training duty. This usually lasts approximately two to four weeks a
year. The cases have, for the most part, upheld the right of reservists
to wear wigs during their weekend forays into the military sphere
while at least one case has hinted that wigs can be legally banned for
the longer active duty for training periods.'
B. Regulars: Can They Ever Legally Wear Wigs?
The present policy of the Navy as well as the Air Force is that wigs
can be worn by regular servicemen on active duty only to "cover nat-
ural baldness or for cosmetic reasons (disfiguration)."'2 However, at
least as to the Navy, this policy cannot be found in any written regula-
tion but only in individual letters issued by the Bureau of Naval
Personnel on a case by case basis. An obvious objection which imme-
diately appears from the "baldness-disfiguration" exception is that this
policy discriminates between those persons who are not so unfortunate
so as to meet this criteria and those who do. At least one court has
found this distinction to be uncohstitutional; however, the court only
directed its remarks regarding this policy in its application to reserv-
ists.8 It appears safe to say, however, that this same distinction among
regulars would also fall. Another consideration is that if reservists are
to be allowed to wear wigs, then a prohibition against' the wearing of
wigs by regulars would appear to violate a federal statute which for-
bids discrimination between regulars and reservists.
4
II. THE PRESENT REGULATIONS AND THEIR INTERPRETATIONS
A. Navy
The only codified statement. regarding hair- is found in United
States Navy Uniform Regulations, 1969, chapter one, section one (ap-
1. Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198, (E.D. Va. 1973).
3. Id.
4. 10 US.C. § 277 (1970) states:
"Regular and Reserve Components: Discrimination Prohibited"
Laws applying to both Regulars and Reserves shall be administered without dis-
crimination-
(1) among Regulars;
(2) among Reserves; and
(3) between Regulars and Reserves
162
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pearance), article 0111 (grooming). The provision is divided into two
basic sections, one applying to men, the other, to women. Although
the regulation states that no exact minimum or maximum length is
prescribed, it states an' assortment of criteria which the hair must meet.
The first section, which discusses grooming for men, states that hair
must be neat, clean, trimmed, present a groomed appearance, not
touch the collar, not fall below the eyebrows, not brush excessively
below the band of properly worn headgear and not interfere with the
wearing of such military headgear. Certain hair styles are permitted
such as "Afro" or "natural," but they too, must meet the various criteria
stated above. The regulation prohibits other hair styles such as plaited
or braided hair when worn while in uniform or in an active duty
station.
The second section pertains to women. 5 The main difference in
treatment appears to be that while men's hair may not touch the
collar, women's may.
As can be seen, there is absolutely nothing in the regulations about
the wearing of wigs. In effect, the regulations state the ends to be
achieved and wigs are merely a means for achieving that end.
In late August, 1973, the Navy issued a message to all reserve units
which allows the wearing of wigs to drill by reservists.6 This was a
drastic change from the Navy's prior policy of wig prohibition.
B. Marine Corps
The Marines have the most stringent hair restriction of any of the
Armed Services. Their regulation for men prescribes the length of hair
as well as its style. The hair must be neat, closely trimmed at the top,
sides, and back, and must present an "evenly graduated appearance."
5. Uniform Navy Reg., art. 0111(2a) (1969). Waves are allowed to wear wigs by way of
an unwritten policy. This discrimination between men and women is subject to attack.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
6. Message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Naval Reserve, Aug.
23, 1973, which stated:
1. In response to questions concerning the wearing of wigs by Naval Reservists per-
forming inactive duty for training (drills) the following policy guidance is provided:
A. Wigs may be worn provided that
(1) outward appearance conforms to grooming regulations ....
(2) they are well fitting and of good quality.
(3) they do not interfere with the proper performance of duty.
2. There is no change concerning the standards to be applied to active duty per-
sonnel including reserve personnel on active duty for training.
163
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The maximum hair length is three inches and conspicuous sideburns
are prohibited.7
The Marines, unlike the Navy and the Air Force, do not permit, as
a matter of policy, the wearing of wigs for any reason. This eliminates
the attack of discrimination in favor of bald or disfigured personnel,
since they cannot wear wigs either.
C. Army
Until recently, the Army has also had a prohibition against the
wearing of wigs to comply with grooming standards.8 However, the
Army has changed its written regulation to allow reservists to wear
wigs during weekend drills as well as during the summer training
duty.9 The Army still maintains a prohibition against the wearing of
wigs by regulars; there are, however, exceptions for baldness or dis-
figuration.10
D. Air Force
The grooming regulations of the Air Force discuss both hair and
the wearing of wigs.11 The Air Force hair section pertaining to men
is essentially the same as that of the Navy's. The section also lists criteria
which, in effect, set a maximum hair length, although no specific state-
ment regarding hair length is stated such as in the Marine or Navy
regulations. The hair style worn is also subject to the listed criteria.
7. Marine Corps Order No. 1020.34B, g 1101 (April 22, 1966).
8. Army Reg. No. 600-20, ff 5-39.
9. Id. as amended by change made in message from the Chief of Naval Operations to
the Chief of Naval Reserve, Feb. 23, 1973 which stated:
Male members of the reserve components may wear a wig or hair piece during unit
training assemblies and when servin; on active duty for training for periods of
thirty days or less or on full time training duty for periods of thirty days or less, if
it conforms to the standard haircut criteria stated above and does not interfere with
performance of duty. When ordered, for a period of more than thirty days to active
duty, active duty for training, or full time training duty, the wearing of a wig or
hair piece by male members of the reserve components in uniform or on duty is
prohibited except as provided in subparagraph 5-39C(4), above.
Id. g1 (D).
10. Id. 9 (D)(4).
The wearing of a wig or hairpiece by male personnel while in uniform or on duty
is prohibited except to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration caused by
accident or medical procedure. When worn it will conform to the standard haircut
criteria as stated.
11. Air Force Reg. dated Dec. 1, 1972. reference AFM 35-10 relating to the wearing of
wigs.
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On the wearing of wigs, the section states that wigs can be worn
while on duty or in uniform only for cosmetic reasons to cover natural
baldness or physical disfiguration. The wig itself must conform to the
standards set for natural hair.
In sum, the present situation regarding the positions of the vari-
ous services is:
(a) Navy: unwritten policy permitting wigs to be worn by regulars
or reservists for baldness or cosmetic reasons; written policy
allowing wigs to be worn by all reservists during drills;
(b) Marine Corps: unwritten policy prohibiting wigs under any
circumstances;
(c) Army: written policy allowing regulars to wear wigs only for
baldness or disfiguration; written policy allowing reservists to
wear wigs during weekly drills and during active duty for train-
ing under thirty days;
(d) Air Force: written wig policy allowing the wearing of wigs for
cosmetic or baldness reasons.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE WIG CASES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
A. The Pre-Wig (Hair) Cases12
The first major development in the military cases regarding hair
and the subsequent wig controversy occurred in Smith v. Resor.8 Here,
the plaintiff was a member of a local rock and roll group known as
"The Fugitives." The plaintiff, Smith, due to his band membership
commenced to grow his hair longer than that permitted by Army
regulations. After approximately three years, Smith moved up the
theatrical ladder to a group called the "Laffin Giraffe" and continued
to let his locks grow. As a result of plaintiff's hirsute appearance his
participation in his required reserve drills was deemed to be un-
satisfactory and pursuant to section 673(a) of the United States Code, 14
12. The distinction should be drawn between "hair cases" not involving the wearing
of wigs and solely concerning persons seeking to wear hair longer than that permitted
by the written grooming regulations and the "wig cases" in which the grooming regula-
tions are attempted to be complied with (or circumvented, depending on one's point of
view) by the use of a wig.
13. 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
14. 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1970). provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the President may order to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months any
member of the Ready Reserve of an armed force who:
(1) is not assigned to, or participating satisfactorily in, a unit of the Ready Reserve;
(2) has not fulfilled his statutory reserve obligation.
165
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and the applicable regulations, plaintiff became liable for call-up to
active duty for a period not to exceed a total of 24 months. Because the
Army failed to follow its own procedures and safeguards in dealing
with Smith (Smith was told he had no rights of administrative relief
regarding his call-up orders), a stay of the call-up was granted and the
Army was directed to permit full appeal by Smith.
It is significant to note that the basis of Smith's refusal to cut his hair
was that it was necessary to his occupation. The court, however,
refused to review the validity of the Army's policy of activating re-
servists because of unsatisfactory drill performance resulting from
improper haircuts. In dicta, the court also stated that the appearance
of a reservist is, absent extraordinary circumstances, within the juris-
diction of the Army.15
The next development in the Army Reserve occurred in the case of
Raderman v. Kaine.16 This case, too, involved a battle between the
world of rock and roll and the military. Here, the plaintiff, Raderman,
was an agent for rock and roll bands, and as such, had argued that
the length of his hair was necessary to his occupation. Here, the court
squarely faced the constitutional issue in the hair dispute, stating that
being in the Army suspends certain constitutional rights.17 The court
reaffirmed the dicta in Smith that appearance of its personnel is a
matter within the jurisdiction and reasonable discretion of the Army.'8
The court stated the reservist's dilemma, thus:
The problem with a reservist, such as Raderman, is that he is
neither a civilian nor a fulltime soldier. In effect he must live in
two worlds, one military and- 6ne civilian and attempt to satisfy
the requirements of both.' 9
The court also went on to state that even though the appearance of
the military has changed radically throughout history, "past practices
afford no criteria for the present,"20 and a court is in no position to
make a judgment in this type of case.
The first National Guard case regarding activation because of un-
satisfactory drill performance due to length of hair sprung up in early
1970, in Gianatasio v. Whyte. 2' Again, the plaintiff attempted to justify
15. Smith v.'Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969).
16. 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969).
17. Id. at 1104.
18. Id. at 1106.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1970).
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his wearing of long hair by his occupation. Here it was argued that
"since it is now fashionable for men to have long hair and since [plain-
tiff] . . . is now a salesman of fashionable shoes and clothing he could
not possibly sway someone toward a look, that with a short haircut,
he would appear for all purposes, not to understand."22 The court
followed Raderman in upholding the military, but tucked away in
the final paragraph of the court's opinion is the following omen:
Appellant's final argument apparently seeks to have us overrule
Raderman v. Kaine, supra, on grounds that the Guard's "neat ap-
pearance" rules unjustly deprive him of his right to a livelihood in
civilian life. We decline so to rule and note in the words of the
court below ". . . that the plaintiff could have worn an appro-
priate wig, thereby complying with military requirements and
satisfy the appearance needs of the job."2'
In Krill v. Bauer,24 the defendant Army emerged victorious as the
court sustained the Army's hair regulations and held that Army re-
servists were not entitled to an injunction against the enforcement of
these regulations on the ground that the regulations subjected plain-
tiffs to additional unexcused absences thereby making them liable for
involuntary active duty. The court found the regulations to be con-
stitutional. The issue posed was stated and answered by the court in
this manner: "Does being in the Army curtail or suspend certain
Constitutional rights?, the answer is unqualifiedly 'yes'." 25
The authoritative case in the pre-wig area is Anderson v. Laird.26
In this case plaintiff did not allege an occupational justification for his
long hair, but based his claim solely on the bare "right to wear his
hair 'in a style currently fashionable.' "27 The court sua sponte brought
up the matter whether a reservist or a National Guard member should
be afforded different treatment "inasmuch as a substantial portion of
his time is spent in civilian pursuits rather than military." 28 This
theme, as we will see, has played a decisive role in the wig cases.
The court in Anderson upheld the military's position on the hair
22. Id. at 909.
23. Id. at 911 (emphasis added). Note, however, that this sentence is somewhat am-
biguous in that it is unsure whether the court meant for plaintiff to wear a short wig
during his military duty and retain his natural long hair, or wear a long hair wig for
civilian life and have short natural hair. It appears to this writer that the court meant
the former.
24. 314 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
25. Id. at 966-67.
26. 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971).
27. Id. at 913.
28. Id. at 915.
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issue. The opinion of Judge Reynolds (concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), however, plants the seeds for many of the opposite hold-
ings in the subsequent wig cases. First, he states that the right to wear
one's hair in any style he desires is an ingredient of personal freedom
which is constitutionally protected and that in order for a state to
curtail this right, it must show a substantial justification."
Second, the theme of the minimal amount of time spent by the
reservist in the military sphere as opposed to the civilian sphere is
discussed (as in Anderson). The opinion demonstrates concern that
the majority apparently took an "all or nothing approach" in stating
that if the appellant was not completely civilian, then he must be
completely military. This categorization of the reservist as being com-
pletely military allowed the majority to conclude that nothing more
need be shown by the defendant to justify this interference with the
reservist's private life.
Finally, Reynolds ends his separate opinion by stating:
- I am presently unconvinced that short hair in the national
guard is sufficiently important to the orderly administration of
our armed forces to warrant the punitive activation of a guardsman
who asserts the right to determine the length of his own hair.80
The final case, in the pre-wig cases is Agrati v. Laird.38 Here, an
entertainment personality (Don Grady of television's "My Three
Sons") sought an exception to the Army Reserve hair policy. In a brief
opinion, the court, citing the classic case of Orloff v. Willoughby, 2
regarding the reluctance of courts to interfere with the legitimate
exercise of discretion over military internal matters, and Raderman,
affirmed the opinion of the district court holding for the Army.
In summarizing the pre-wig cases, the major impact is that of total
military victory on the hair issue. The constitutional bases alleged by
the plaintiffs encompassed the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.
Despite these constitutional allegations, the courts had found that
"the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty." 8 It is also
important to note that at this point in the development of the cases,
168
29. Id. at 916 (Reynolds, J., concurring & dissenting opinion).
30. Id. at 917.
31. 440 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1971).
32. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
33. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
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the courts had also found that they had jurisdiction to decide the cases
and had done so on the merits.
B. The Wig Cases
The first major decision in which a reservist attempted to comply
with the hair regulations by using a short hair wig was an Air Force
case, Cossey v. Seamans8 4 Here the court decided the case on the
jurisdictional issue, finding that (1) no jurisdictional amount had
been shown under the federal question statute, 5 (2) the mandamus
statute"6 could not be used to create jurisdiction where none existed
before, and (3) matters of dress and appearance are within the dis-
cretion of the military and are not judicially reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act.3 7 The court, in its discussion of the lack
of jurisdiction under the mandamus claim of plaintiff, cited the prior
hair cases with approval, using them to demonstrate the lack of exist-
ence of a clear right on the part of the plaintiff to the relief requested,
and the lack of a clear duty on the part of the defendant to the plain-
tiff.8  The court also found that even though there may be no other
adequate remedy available to plaintiff, this alone does not establish
jurisdiction under the mandamus statute, 9 where the two other
elements for mandamus relief have been found to be lacking.40
The next case, Harris v. Kaine,41 has stood out as a landmark in
this area along with Friedman v. Froehlke.2 Harris was an action by
an Army reservist in which it was alleged that the Army regulation
prohibiting the wearing of wigs at reserve meetings (as opposed to
the summer active duty for training periods) infringed unnecessarily
on his constitutional rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The court found jurisdiction on all the grounds alleged by plain-
tiff.43 This was an obvious turnaround from the preceding decision in
34. 344 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
36. Id. § 1361.
37. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04 (1970).
38. 344 F. Supp. at 1370.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
40. 344 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
41. 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
42. 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972).
43. The plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under the following statutes: 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04
(1970); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1846(a)(2), 1361 (1970). Section 1346(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims, of ....
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000
169
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Cossey. First, the court found that plaintiff had stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted, distinguishing the hair cases by stating:
Unlike these cases, however, plaintiff does not ask the Court to
determine what constitutes a neat and soldierly appearance or to
grant him an exception to the standard. Rather, plaintiff contends
that defendants have exceeded their statutory authority and un-
necessarily infringed upon his constitutionally protected rights by
prohibiting his wearing of a short-hair wig at drill meetings.
Clearly, then the Court is faced with an alleged set of extraor-
dinary circumstances to which the Court of Appeals has made
reference.44
Second, on the matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the court found
that while it had no jurisdiction to review purely discretionary acts of
the Army, it did have jurisdiction to determine whether the Army has
stayed within the bounds of its authorized discretionary sphere.45
One of the turning points in this case was that plaintiff, with his wig,
did present a neat and soldierly appearance (the defendant Army con-
ceded this). Since the Army regulation permitted bald or disfigured
men to wear short hair wigs that conform to Army standards, and since
the plaintiff spent only a small fraction of his time on military duty,46
the court concluded that the defendant Army had exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating a regulation proscribing the wearing of
wigs while in uniform or duty status. 47 Another key finding of the
court was that the wearing of the wig did not interfere with the per-
formance of plaintiff's duties at drill meetings (the Army conceded this
point).
On the test to be. applied, however, the court hedged. The court
recognized a divergence of opinion on the burden the Government
must overcome in order to be able to infringe on the right to govern
one's own appearance. The two divergent views were a "substantial
burden of justification," held by the Seventh Circuit; and a "legitimate
in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.
44. 852 F. Supp. at 771 (emphasis partially added).
45. Id. at 772.
46. Id. at 773 n.5.
Plaintiff seems to have conceded that during the time that he is on active duty, gen-
erally an anmal two week period at summer camp, defendants have the statutory
authority to require that his hair conform to AR 600-20 and that such an infringe-
ment upon his constitutional rights is justified.
Id.
47. Id. at 778.
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governmental interest" requiring the restriction, held by the First
Circuit. The court found that the defendants had satisfied neither test
and, therefore, did not determine which one was applicable.4
In Bellamy v. Froehlke,49 Judge McMillan, in a brief opinion,
granted a temporary restrainingorder against the defendant Army and
made an important contribution to the case law regarding the baldness
and disfiguration exception which was written into the Army wig
regulation at that time. The court stated that plaintiff's complaint
stated a valid prima facie ground for relief. The complaint stated:
the regulation invidiously discriminates between reservists
who are scarred or naturally bald on the one hand and reservists
like the plaintiffs whose defect is a head of. flowing locks which,
like baldness or keloids, can be successfully and effectively con-
cealed by a wig.50
In Baugh v. Bennett,51 a renewed petition for habeas corpus seeking
a court-ordered discharge from the military, an Idaho National Guard
member, Baugh, was held to have fatally compromised his -claim that
the reason for his -involuntary active duty stemmed from his wearing
a wig to conceal his long hair. Here, the court based its holding in
favor of the military on the fact that the call-up to active duty was
based on the plaintiff's failure to attend required drills and not because
he wore a wig when he did attend. The court, in dicta, went on to say
that even if the plaintiff had not thus compromised his wig allegation,
it would be without merit. The court, citing Orloff, Arnheiter v.
Chaffe,52 Raderman, and Anderson, relied on the rationale of the
previous hair cases that the military has the authority to regulate its
internal activities and these exercises of discretion are not subject to
judicial review5 3
In December, 1972, a victory for the Army was registered in Mc-
Whirter v. Froehlke.54 The court,held that (1) the subject matter of
the suit was rightfully vested in military authority and was not a
matter for the courts, (2) military regulations concerning hair length
raised no constitutional implications, and (3) enhancement of discipline
48. Id. at 777.
49. 347 F. Supp. 1241 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
50. Id. at 1242.
51. 350 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Id. 1972).
52. 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970).
53. 350 F. Supp. at 1251.
54. 351 F. Supp. 1098 (D.S.C. 1972). During the same period of time, however, the Army
lost Krueger v. Laird, Civil No. 4-72 (D. Minn. Nov..13, 1972).
.1711
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furnished justification for the regulation.5 5 The court cited the hair
cases, relying heavily on Anderson, Raderman and Cossey, which had
refused to make a distinction between the ends (uniform grooming)
and the means (using a wig as a method of compliance). Furthermore,
the court found the applicable standard to be that the government
must show a "substantial justification" for the wig regulation.5 The
court found that the enhancement of discipline met this test.5 7
The second landmark opinion in the wig litigation came in a case
styled Friedman v. Froehlke,8 which declared that the Army wig
regulation was invalid as applied to reserve members of the National
Guard. The court first disposed of the defendant's arguments that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question
statute.59 The court went on to stress, as the Harris tribunal did, the
very small fraction of time spent by the plaintiffs in the military sphere,
the finding of the district court that the wigs in question cannot be
detected nor can be easily dislodged, and the basic constitutional
proposition that the right to wear one's hair as he wishes is a constitu-
tionally protected freedom.60 The final distinction made by the court
is stated as follows:
While the wig regulation appears in the section entitled "Appear-
ance," it is not a regulation concerning appearance, but one pre-
scribing a method of achieving the required appearance. The issue
in the case, therefore, is not whether the Army or the Guard may
adopt requirements affecting hair length and style. Plaintiffs must
and do concede authority for appearance standards. Nor is the
issue whether the Army may specify the manner in which a pre-
scribed appearance is achieved for its full-time personnel. The
narrow issue is whether the Guard may require reservists . . . to
conform to Army haircut requirements. 6'
Comunale v. Mier2 marks the last victory for the military on the
wig issue. This was an action by an Air National Guard member to
enjoin his commanding officer from enforcing the hair regulations
against him and from refusing to allow the plaintiff to wear his wig
55. 351 F. Supp. at 1099-101.
56. Id. at 1101.
57. Id.
58. 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972).
59. Id. at 1352, citing 28 US.C. § 1331 (1970). For other comments by the court on thejurisdictional bases, see 470 F.2d at 1352 n.l.
60. Id. at 1353.
61. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
62. 355 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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at drills. The military v. rock and roll music clash again surfaced
because plaintiff was a member of a "hard rock" music group and
claimed that if he had to cut his hair it would jeopardize his job. The
possibility of plaintiff getting his natural hair cut and wearing a long
wig while performing was mentioned by the court With the plaintiff,
during his testimony, rejecting such an option since he works more
time at his civilian job than in the military. 63 The court went on to
state three factors that weighed heavily against plaintiff's claim: (1)
plaintiff joined the Guard voluntarily and at that time agreed to
comply with its regulations (the court ignored the claim made in later
cases that in reality the joining of such a guard or reserve unit was not
"voluntary" in the true sense of the word, because the individual would
be subject to the compulsory draft if he did not enlist in such an
organization), (2) the traditional Orloff theme that courts should not
readily interfere in internal military matters, and (3) the regulation
was part of a legitimate exercise of military discretion in controlling
appearance of its members.6 4
The Comunale court dismissed the two most important wig opin-
ions up to this point, Harris and Friedman in one sentence.65 The
most remarkable aspect of this feat was that the court did not even
state a reason for its ignoring the two cases not did it even attempt to
distinguish them (probably because there was no valid basis for doing
so). Instead, the court chose to rely on Orloff (a non-wig, non-hair
case) and Anderson (a non-wig case), As a sidelight it should be noted
that plaintiff appeared in court wearing his wig.
The first major development in the wig case area for the Marine
Corps, the most austere of the services on the hair issue, was Garmon
v. Warner.06 It should be remembered that the Marine Corps hair
regulation not only stated that hair should be worn neatly, etc., like
the other service's regulations, but also specifies a three inch maximum
length, 7 and makes no wig exceptions whatsoever, even for baldness
or disfiguration. Plaintiffs were members of the Marine Corps Reserve
Unit located in Charlotte, North Carolina. They wore wigs for several
months before their superiors finally noticed them. At that time they
were told that wigs would be thereafter prohibited. As a result, plain-
63. Id. at 431.
64. Id. at 431-32.
65. Id. at 431.
66. 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
67. Marine Corps Order No. 1020.34B, g 1101 (Apr. 22, 1966).
173
Duquesne Law Review
tiffs were subject to being marked absent without leave if they came
to drill wearing their wigs as this, would be considered by the Corps as
no valid drill appearance at all.
The court found jurisdiction under the federal question statute.6
The required amount in controversy of $10,000 was found existent,
with the court including the value of the mental anguish suffered as a
result of activation as part of its computations. An equitable approach
to this valuation of constitutional rights was taken when the court
stated that those who seem to deprive other men of loss of freedom for
protracted periods cannot be heard to say that the loss of freedom was
not worth more than $10,000.69
Jurisdiction was also found under the Administrative Procedure
Act70 and the mandamus statute.71 The case stands as ,one of the few
decisions in which the Administrative Procedure Act has been used as
a gTant of jurisdiction.72
In addressing the regulation itself, the court found that it contained
no mention of wigs and no definition of hair as. meaning natural
"home-grown" hair, as opposed to natural "store-bought" hair. The
court concluded that the no-wig fiat was. based on a recently created
and rigidly maintained, though not written or codified, policy.73
The standard used by the court was whether the "no wig" prohibi-
tion as applied to part-time reservists served any legitimate purpose of
the military so as to justify intrusion into the civilian lives of reserv-
ists.74 Note that the court here used a more liberal test than that used
in Anderson and McWhirter (where a "substantial burden of justifica-
tion" was necessary), and followed the test set down in Friedman.
The court disposed of the arguments made by the Marine Corps
that (1) wigs would interfere with military operations, (2) wigs hurt
the goal of discipline and group identification of the elite service, (3)
68. 358 F. Supp. at 208, citing 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1970).
69. 358 F. Supp. at 208. Contra, McGraw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
72. See also Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351, 1352 n.1 (lst Cir. 1972); Rice v.
United States, 348 F. Supp. 254 (D.N.D. 1972). Contra, Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467
F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1972); Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 449 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1971); Pan American World Airways v. CAB,
392 F.2d 483, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1960); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 785 (5th
Cir. 1956); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972); McEachern v. United States,
212 F. Supp. 706, 710 (W.D.S.C. 1963). See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952).
73. 358 F. Supp. at 209.
74. id.
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regulars and reservists should be treated alike as part of the "one
service concept," (4) if part-time reservists were allowed to wear wigs,
a spirit of non-cooperation between reservists and regulars would be
fostered and a morale problem would arise and (5) all orders must be
obeyed.75 In answering these arguments the court stressed that there
was a real difference between reservists and regulars, and that with
wigs the outward appearance of plaintiffs conformed to the text of the
written regulation.7 6 The court cited with approval the two major
cases of Harris and Friedman while noting that the cases have been
divided on this matter.
On plaintiffs' constitutional argument regarding the right to wear
their hair as they please under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the court found the Marine hair regulation to be uncon-
stitutional as applied. 77
The court also refuted one of the prongs of prior military wig vic-
tories, such as Communale, which stated that plaintiff's claim should
fail because he voluntarily joined the reserves and knew of the regula-
tions and agreed to comply with them at that time. The defendants
had contended that plaintiffs had waived any right to object to Marine
hair regulations by voluntarily signing enlistment contracts knowing
the Corps regulates personal appearance. The court found that there
were two problems with this contention. In the first place, there was
no evidence that any of the plaintiffs knew wigs were taboo for reserv-
ists (the hair regulation does not mention wigs, and the no wig rule
did not even exist when they enlisted). Therefore, there was no know-
ing and voluntary relinquishment of an understood right. Second, the
court found that it would be exceedingly unwise policy to deny to
military volunteers the right to go to court to challenge the military
wisdom or the constitutional validity of military regulations. The
military was found to be already protected from any saturation bar-
rage of court orders by the narrowness of the scope of available review,
and there was no need to increase that protection by implying a waiver
where none in fact took place.73
In Hough v. Seaman,79 Judge McMillan again had an opportunity
to further his reputation as an expert in the wig field.80 In a rather
75. Id. at 210.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 211.
78. Id. at 211-12.
79. 357 F. Supp. 1145 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
80. Judge McMillan had previously decided both Bellamy v. Froehlke, 347 F. Supp.
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short opinion, the judge held that the Air Force regulation prohibit-
ing the wearing of wigs except for cosmetic reasons exceeded the au-
thority conferred by statute and the Constitution on military com-
manders, constituted an unwarranted intrusion into civilian life, dis-
criminated among reservists without necessary military basis, and, ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver of an understood right, could
not be enforced against reservists."'
The next decision regarding wigs was that of Miller v. Ackerman,82
another Marine Corps case. This case is significant in that, for the first
time, one branch of the military, the Marines, tried to distinguish itself
from the other military services. Up to this point, the courts had as-
sumed that the requirements and reasons set forth by the various ser-
vices were all basically the same. In Miller, however, the Marine Corps
argued it was sui generis because the Marine Corps is a separate, elite
group of disciplined soldiers and the regulations adopted by the Corps
are designed to reinforce this status as part of the Marine Corps mis-
sion, and the status of the Corps is maintained by the short hair rule,
since it distinguishes the Corps from other military groups.83 It should
be noted at this point that the Marine Corps policy regarding wigs
makes no distinction, as do the other services, in regards to baldness or
disfiguration. This was a further basis upon which the Marine Corps
sought to disassociate itself from the other military services in regard
to the wearing of wigs as a method of compliance with the Marine
hair regulation.
The court based its jurisdictional findings on the mandamus sta-
tute.84 The court further indicated that mandamus jurisdiction would
be available when the plaintiff alleges either a violation of his con-
stitutional rights or that defendants had acted in excess of their statu-
tory authority.8 5
Going on to the merits, the court, citing Harris and Friedman, and
noting that the Army had since changed its regulation, found that the
Marine Corps regulation as applied to reservists was unreasonable.86
1241 (W.D.N.C. 1972). and Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973), unfavor-
ably for the military
81. 357 F. Supp. at 1147.
82. Civ. No. CV 73-L-121 (D. Neb., Apr. 30, 1973).
83. Id. at 3.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
85. Civil No. CV 73-L-121, at 6 (D. Neb., Apr. 30, 1973).
86. Id.
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The court rejected the claim that the Marine Corps should not be
put into the same category as the other services.
The court also placed the burden of showing the reasonableness of
the regulation on the Marine Corps.8 7 This was the first time a court
had so expressly reversed the usual burden of proof, thus making the
situation analogous to the category of "suspect" classifications under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8
An interesting case which made a collateral attack on the Navy's un-
written anti-wig policy came about in May, 1973, and was styled
Etheridge v. Thorn. 9 After missing the required number of drills,
petitioner was ordered to active duty for a period of twenty-one days.
Upon reporting for duty, petitioner was ordered to have his hair cut.
He refused and a court-martial ensued. In his complaint seeking
habeas corpus relief, the plaintiff sought (1) to have the court enjoin
his court-martial hearing then in progress concerning petitioner's re-
fusal to obey the haircut order while on active duty, (2) a declaration
that the Navy regulation regarding haircuts to be void, and (3) his
immediate release from active duty.9 0 In substance, petitioner sought
to have the regulation dealing with hair grooming declared uncon-
stitutional and void, which in turn would void the court-martial pro-
ceedings against him and release him from duty.9'
The reason this case is under the wig category rather than the hair
category is that petitioner at all relevant times was wearing a wig.
However, the evidence was uncontradicted that even with the wig
petitioner's hair was hanging below his collar and did not meet
regulations.9 2
In deciding the case in favor of the defendant by rejecting plaintiff's
petition for habeas corpus, the court cited with approval the major
decisions up to that point. However, the court found an important
distinction in refuting petitioner's argument that he was covered under
the holding in Friedman when it stated:
87. Id. at 8.
88. In recent years, the Supreme Court has characterized certain classifications as
"suspect," such as those based on race, religion, alienage, legitimacy and has required a
"compelling state interest" to be shown by the state. Fundamental rights such as pro-
creation, voting, etc., also demand similar protection by this harsh and strict standard.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Batey v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
89. Civil No. 160-73-N (E.D. Va., May 8, 1973).
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 3-4.
92. Id. at 4-5.
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Petitioner relies on the decision in Friedman v. Froehike ...
The facts of that case are to a degree different from the case of
petitioner. Here, the evidence is uncontradicted that when wear-
ing the wig, the petitioner's hair styling did not comply with the
Regulation. Several witnesses testified that when petitioner wore
the wig, his hair extended from beneath the wig and was down
over his collar.
In addition, the Friedman case differs from the cases in other
circuits hereinabove cited, in that the Friedman case exempts a
reservist from complying with regular military regulations.
Petitioner does not bring himself within the coverage of the
Friedman case.98
Good v. Mauriello, 4 involved an action by an Air Force reservist to
enjoin the enforcement of the Air Force wig regulation prohibiting
the wearing of wigs at weekly drills. The court found the distinction
between bald and disfigured personnel who were allowed to wear wigs
and others who were not so allowed to be a discriminatory classifica-
tion not justified by the evidence. The court aptly characterized the
regulation: "It appears sufficient to say that the wig regulation is not
concerned with a neat and soldierly appearance, but is one which
forbids a method of achieving the required appearance." 95 Addition-
ally, the court stated that "if the wig otherwise complies with the
regulations, the plaintiff may wear it to scheduled drills."9 6
In Klinkhammer v. Richardson,97 plaintiffs made the first attempt
to have the court characterize the suit as a class action. This was a
Marine Corps wig case in which the reservists-plaintiffs sought (1) to
have the court declare the Marine hair regulation invalid, (2) to enjoin
any disciplinary action (involuntary call-up to active duty) for its past
or future violation and (3) to have costs awarded. 9
The court gave an excellent discussion of jurisdiction under the
federal question statute.99 The problem of valuation of the intangible
rights involved, as well as the hardship of activation to a reservist, was
discussed at length. First, the court stated that the burden of pleading
and, when challenged, of supporting jurisdictional facts "by com-
93. Id. at 13-14.
94. 358 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
95. Id. at 114.
96. Id.
97. 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973).
98. Id. at 68.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
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petent and preponderant proof" is upon the plaintiff.100 It went on:
Although the general rule [a federal question plus $10,000] is easy
enough to state, it can be difficult to apply, especially to an action
involving the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. These
rights are among our most valuable and prized possessions; yet
they are not always subject to precise monetary quantification.
Courts have followed a variety of approaches to cope with the
problem of translating the intangible value of constitutional rights
into dollar amounts. A few courts have embraced the position that
constitutional rights are "inherently priceless" and by definition
exceed in value the $10,000 jurisdictional amount. . . . Some
courts have adopted the opposite view and have held that a cause
of action for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights cannot
meet the $10,000 requirement because those rights are not pre-
cisely quantifiable ....
A number of courts have taken a middle ground between these
two approaches in which they have attempted to ascribe a mone-
tary value to the particular deprivation alleged in a given
case ...
Moreover, those courts which have attempted to value constitu-
tional rights for jurisdictional purposes generally articulate the
view that it is better to err on the side of a high valuation lest the
plaintiff be left without a forum in which to air his grievances.
. . .[I]t has been the rule . . . that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.10'
The court went on to state that the right in question was the right of
Marine reservists to wear short hair wigs to reserve drills so as to main-
tain satisfactory participation at the drills and thereby avoid involun-
tary activation. 0 2 The court concluded its jurisdictional discussion by
listing the factors which must be added up to determine whether the
required amount in controversy is present. The court stated, inter
alia, that the economic impact of activation cannot be limited to a
comparison of relative pay scales between the civilian pay and the
military pay upon activation. Other factors were removal from family
and dislocation from a civilian job. As to the latter factor, the court
stated that dislocation for one or two years could severely hinder ad-
vancement or permanently preclude the possibility of regaining sim-
ilar opportunities at a future date. Finally, the court noted that the
100. 359 F. Supp. at 69.
101. Id. at 69-70.
102. Id. at 70.
179
Duquesne Law Review
activated reservist is uprooted from his home and thrust into a com-
pletely different environment. The court concluded that the freedoms
inherent in civilian life, as contrasted to the spartan demands of the
military, have a substantial economic value.103
Regarding the class action, the court found that under rule 23(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, joinder of all the members of
the class was not impracticable. Thus, the class action aspect of the
suit was denied.1 0 4
On the merits, the court held that the military had not shown suffi-
ciently "compelling" reasons to justify the policy of no wigs and found
for the plaintiffs.10 5 The court, in so holding, noted two important
points. First, the court noted the practical, real-life fact that many of
the reservist's enlistments were probably encouraged by the Viet Nam
conflict and thus the reservists were not really an eager part of the
Corps, sharing the same camaraderie as the Marine regulars. 08 Second,
the court confined its holding to wigs worn at weekend drills, refusing
to rule on their validity at summer camp. The plaintiffs had stressed
that they only sought to wear the wigs on weekends. 10 7
The most recent case to date in the wig area is Etheridge v. Schles-
inger.108 This case involved the same plaintiffs who had sought habeas
corpus relief in Etheridge v. Thorn.10 9 The court found it had juris-
diction on the basis of the federal question statute,"10 the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,"' and the mandamus statute. 12
The court centered its attention on the distinction made by the
Navy in that the Navy allowed wigs to be worn by bald or disfigured
persons, but not by others to conceal their long hair, characterizing the
issue as whether the administrative distinction made between wigs for
bald headed men and short hair wigs is constitutional.":8 Note that the
short hair wigs in question conformed to the Navy hair regulation." 4
The court characterized the basis of plaintiff's constitutional attack
103. Id.
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id. at 72.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 73.
108. 362 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973).
109. Civil No. 160-73-N (E.D. Va., May 8, 1973).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-04 (1970).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
113. 362 F. Supp. at 203.
114. Id.
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on the no-wig policy as based on the right of privacy.11 5 The court also
alluded to the due process clause of the fifth amendment as a further
basis for the regulation being unconstitutional as applied. As a result,
the short hair wig policy was declared unconstitutional. 116
C. Summary
In the development of the wig and hair cases certain basic proposi-
tions have consistently surfaced. First, the courts have upheld the basic
proposition that certain matters, such as uniform appearance, are
legitimately within the sphere of the military and are matters of in-
ternal discretion. Second, although this discretion does exist, it is
bounded by certain constitutional restraints. Also, relief can be secured
for abuse of this discretion without resort to the Constitution. Third,
the courts appear to feel that hair is a proper subject of the aforemen-
tioned legitimate military discretion over internal matters. Fourth, the
courts have, however, allowed a certain segment of the military pop-
ulation, namely part-time reservists, to use the wig as a method of
achieving the uniform appearance sought by the military. In sum, the
courts have allowed a special class of military personnel, reservists, to
use a special method of compliance to achieve the legitimately reg-
ulated ends.
The most successful arguments advanced by plaintiffs in the wig
cases can also be summarized. First, the right to personal appearance
is a fairly well established constitutional right." 7 Although certain
constitutional rights are legitimately curtailed by one's military status,
the courts have found that the first amendment, the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, and the ninth amendment's right of privacy
have all been sufficient to overcome this presumption of legitimate
military curtailment regarding wig compliance with the hair regula-
tions. Thus, the plaintiffs have emerged victorious. Second, the courts
115. Id. The right of privacy has been held to be part of the ninth amendment
of the United States Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring).
116. 362 F. Supp. at 204.
117. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069
(8th Cir. 1971); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970). Cf. Gfell v. RickelIman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971). Contra, Karr v.
Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (8-7 decision, en banc); King v. Saddleback Junior
College Dist. 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1970). See generally Com-
ment, Public Schools, Long Hair, and the Constitution, 55 IowA L. REv. 707 (1970); 84
HARV. L. REv. 1702 (1971).
181
Duquesne Law Review
have been impressed with the basic inequities involved in the attempt
by the military to regulate one's normal civilian manner of appearance
so as to make it conform to the military's standards even though the
time spent in military duties lasts a fraction of the time of the normal
working year. This can best be categorized as the "disparity of time"
argument.
Finally, the courts have failed to be impressed with the military's
arguments for banning wigs and this has, in itself, worked to plaintiff's
advantage. The claims by the military regarding morale, discipline,
interference with performance of duty, and health have all fallen by
the wayside. At least one court has taken judicial notice that hair and
other disciplinary regulations are often relaxed in combat. 118 The only
possible justification left would be that a wig is a safety hazard. This
argument would appear to be limited in application to persons work-
ing with machinery, etc., where, for example, if a wig fell'into a
machine, it could cause substantial property damage or personal in-
juries.
IV. THE RESULTS OF THE WIG LITIGATION AND THE OUTLOOK
FOR THE FUTURE
A. Changes in the Wig Policy
As has already been stated, the Army has changed its wig policy to
allow -reservists to wear wigs to both weekend drills and while on ac-
tive duty training for periods of up to thirty days. 19 The Marine
Corps has retained their present absolutist no wig polity for ainy per-
sonnel, whether regular or reservist. The Air Force and the Navy
positions lie between the position of the Army, on one hand, and that
of the Marines, on the other. The Air Force allows bald and disfigured
individuals to wear wigs, but no one else. The Navy has changed its
policy to allow reservists to wear wigs for weekend drills but not for
the summer training duty periods. 20
B. Outlook for the Future
The most likely issues to appear in litigation in the near future are:
(1) whether reservists should be allowed to wear wigs not only on the
118. Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 72 (D. Minn. 1973).
119. See note 9 supra.
120. See note 6 supra.
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weekends at their drill meetings, but also during their active duty for
training periods of short duration, (2) whether the distinction between
men and women in regard to the length of their hair and the methods
of compliance (i.e., wigs) is in excess of the military's discretion or
unconstitutional, and (3) whether the distinction between reservists
and regulars is constitutional and if one group is allowed to wear wigs
as a method of complying with the grooming regulation, why not the
other?
Until the military services all take a uniform approach to these ques-
tions, the various litigation sections of the respective Judge Advocate
General's Corps will be kept knee-deep in hair and wig litigation. The
Army (and to a lesser extent, the Navy), which has forged ahead in this
area and which seems to be the only service willing to see the light in
responding to the cases, would appear to cast a doubt on the validity of
any arguments the other services might make to justify their positions
regarding the issue of reservists and wigs.
The major argument which has won the day for the plaintiffs ap-
pears to be that reservists are essentially civilian in nature and the
great disparity of time they spend in civilian* life as opposed to the
time in uniform justifies the wig method of compliance with the hair
regulation. This argument would seem to logically carry over to the
short summer training period. The Army has taken this into account
by including both aspects into their new regulation. With the time
disparity being still greatly disproportionate between summer duty
plus weekend drills and the other civilian time, it would appear that
the courts may also strike down the wig regulation should reservists
attempt to litigate the matter of the wearing of wigs during active duty
for training. The Army regulation, which has already taken this for-
ward step by including summer training duty, would lend further
support to the arguments of potential plaintiffs.
On the matter of the distinction between men and women regard-
ing the wearing of wigs, it would appear that in these times of "libera-
tion" some men's liberators might also raise an outcry. Already in
other areas of military litigation the case is being made for treating
men and women alike.121
Although the military may have a rocky road justifying the differ-
ence in treatment regarding the wearing of wigs by men and women,
121. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Ballard v. Laird, Civil No. 72-
218-S (S.D. Cal.. June 26, 1973).
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and the wearing of wigs by reservists on weekend drills and active duty
for training, it appears that it has a better case to prevent the wearing
of wigs by regulars who have long natural hair.122 No argument can
be made here that a great disparity exists between time spent in uni-
form and time in civilian life, because regulars are, by definition,
military men 100 per cent of the time. Additionally, this would totally
undercut the short hair policy, something the courts in the "hair cases"
have refused to do. The only argument contra would appear to be that
made by the military in the "hair cases," to wit, that the reserves and
the regulars are all part of a unified "one force concept" and, there-
fore, all should be treated the same across the board. By arguing this,
the regular plaintiff would, in effect, be arguing offensively what the
military argued defensively in the "hair cases."
It appears that the wave of wig litigation is at an important stage
in its evolution. Hopefully, the other military services (besides the
Army) will forestall any further litigation by changing their regula-
tions to conform to the multitude of adverse court decisions. Certainly
such a comparatively trivial area such as wigs and the length of hair
should not cause such pervasive litigation.128 The words of one court
have attempted to put this whole matter into proper perspective:
The ancient strong man Sampson, General George Washington,
General Ulysses S. Grant and other military personages have man-
aged to ply their military genius effectively in time of war, despite
the handicap of unshaven faces or unshorn locks.
Not so the modem American peace time . . . Reserve.12 4
C. Proposals
The most logical solution for the wig problem is allowing both reg-
ulars and reservists to wear wigs during the performance of their duties
as long as the wigs pose no health or safety hazard. The justification
for short hair as a method of discipline is, at best, a roundabout
method of achieving the same. As the quotation above points out,
military effectiveness and discipline have been shown to have no rela-
122. Cf. Stradley v. Anderson, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973) (involved a policeman). It
should be noted that since the new Army regulation change allowing wigs for reservists,
there have been no reported cases brought by Army regulars seeking to wear wigs. Note,
however, the possibility of the use of 10 U.S.C. § 277 (1970), as a method of attack by
regulars seeking to wear wigs. See note 13 supra.
123. There have been at least 30 wig cases since April, 1972.
124. Bellamy v. Froehlke, 547 F. Supp. 1241 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
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tion to the length of one's hair. It would be well to remember that
when Sampson's hair was cut, he became a weakling; it is possible that
if the military allows the converse of its present policy, morale, re-
cruitment, retention, discipline, and the effective fulfillment of its
mission might be enhanced by the presence of more Sampsons within
its ranks.
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